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Abstract
This paper contributes to a burgeoning area of investigation, the ambigui-
ty inherent in mathematics and the implications for physics of this ambiguity.
To display the mathematical form of equations of quantum theory used to
describe experiments, we make explicit the knobs by which the devices of an
experiment are arranged and adjusted. A quantum description comes in two
parts: (1) a statement of results of an experiment, expressed by probabilities
of detections as functions of knob settings, and (2) an explanation of how
we think these results come about, expressed by linear operators, also as
functions of knob settings. Because quantum mechanics separates the two
parts of any description, it is known that between the statements of results
and the explanations lurks a logical gap: given any statement of results one
has a choice of explanations.
Here we work out some consequences of this openness to choice. We show
how quantum theory as mathematical language in which to describe exper-
iments necessarily involves multiple descriptions: multiple explanations of a
given result, as well as multiple statements of results and multiple arrange-
ments of knobs. Appreciating these multiplicities resolves what otherwise
is a confusion in the concept of invariance. Implications of multiplicity of
description for the security of quantum key distribution are noted.
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1 Introduction
Quantum theory can be used as a language in which to speak mathematically of
particles and fields or, and this is our focus, as a language in which to describe
experiments with devices, such as lasers and lenses and detectors on a laboratory
bench. To employ quantum theory as mathematical language to describe experi-
ments with devices, one assumes that the devices generate, transform, and measure
particles and/or fields, expressed one way or another as linear operators. We omit
discussing how one arrives at the particles, or even whether one takes them as
observable or as imaginative constructs; instead we attend directly to the linear
operators that end up expressing the devices. These operators are functions of the
parameters by which one describes control over the devices. By making explicit the
parameters that express the knobs and levers that control an experiment, we will
show how quantum theory as mathematical language in which to describe experi-
ments forces multiple descriptions. We will also show a few of the consequences of
this multiplicity.
It is important to recognize that quantum theoretic descriptions of experi-
ments come in two parts: (1) statements of results of an experiment, expressed by
probabilities of detections as functions of knob settings, and (2) explanations of
how one thinks these results come about, also as functions of knob settings. Given
an explanation in terms of linear operators, one knows from the trace rule how to
calculate the probabilities that constitute a statement of results. We will attend as
much, if not more, to the “inverse problem” of choosing linear operators to explain
given probabilities. When we want to create an explanation in operators of a given
statement of results, these results together with the rules of linear operators act as
an axiom system. From the standpoint of logic, an explanation is an interpretation
of the results. Going back at least to Hilbert’s bizarre interpretations of the axioms
of geometry, there is a developing awareness that mathematics is ambiguous, and
that this ambiguity is no fault to be repaired, but is intrinsic to mathematics and
indeed to “language itself” [1].
A few years ago we proved that between the two parts of a description—the
statement of results and the explanation—lurks a gap not bridged by logic, open
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to choice resolvable only by stepping outside logic to make an assumption that,
inspired or not, can be called a guess [2]–[5]. The proof prompts further exploration,
and here we report on: (1) implications of statements of results for the topology of
knobs, independent of choices of explanation; (2) an endless cycle of extensions of
both explanations and statements of results forced by openness to choice; and (3)
an apparent paradox in the concept of invariance, resolved by recognizing multiple
descriptions. Along the way we note implications of ambiguities of description
for quantum cryptography. A take-home lesson is that descriptions expressed in
quantum theory make sense only in a context of more than one description, so that
relations among different descriptions—both the statements of results and their
explanations—become essential ingredients in the very concept of a description.
Note that while our discussion gives knobs a prominent expression absent in
text books on quantum mechanics, we employ the standard quantum mechanics
of Dirac and von Neumann [6, 7], augmented only by positive-operator-valued
measures, now in widespread use.
2 Lattices of domains of knobs and detectors
To display the dependence of quantum explanations on choices, we need first to
say how to express knobs in the mathematical language in which we describe
experimental trials, actual or anticipated. As already noted, the mathematics used
to describe trials of an experiment partitions into a statement of results and an
explanation, both of which depend on the knobs and levers by which one controls
devices arranged into an experiment. Subsuming levers into knobs, we express any
one knob by a set of settings of the knob. Later we will see topologies and metrics
for some knobs but for the moment we take knobs just as sets. A knob depends on
a level of description; what in a coarse description is “a knob” splits in some finer
description into several knobs. (This ambiguity reflects the ambiguity of what to
call an “element of a set”; i.e. an element of one set can itself be a set.)
To permit describing a given experiment at differing levels of detail and to
describe several related experiments that overlap in their knobs, we introduce a
lattice structure for sets of knobs (and later also a lattice for sets of detectors).
We define a knob domain in terms of an unordered product of knobs, as discussed
in Appendix A. Knob domains are partially ordered by the knobs they include.
Given two knob domains K and K0, we can form their meet K ∧K0 (the knobs
they share in common) and their join K ∨K0 (combining all the knobs involved
in either), so that knob domains form a distributive lattice. When a knob domain
K is an unordered product of several knobs, then an element k ∈ K specifies a
particular setting for each of the knobs of K.
A detector is expressed mathematically by a set ≠ of possible outcomes.
We allow for continuous detector responses by dealing with ≠˜, a σ-algebra of
measurable subsets of a detector ≠. Just as experiments can have multiple knobs,
leading to the notion of a knob domain, they can have multiple detectors, again
expressed by unordered products. We call unordered products of detectors detector
domains. Detector domains ≠˜, ≠˜0, . . . form a lattice, as described in Appendix A.
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3 Statements of results and explanations
Given a lattice of knob domains and a lattice of detector domains, let PPM denote
the function that assigns to each knob domain K and each detector domain ≠˜ the
set of parametrized probability measures over that pair of domains:
PPM(K, ≠˜) def= {µ|µ :K × ≠˜→ [0, 1]}, (1)
subject to the condition:
(∀k ∈K) µ(k,−) :≠˜→ [0, 1] is a probability measure on ≠˜. (2)
For any given knob and outcome domains, a statement of results is some µ ∈
PPM(K, ≠˜).
3.1 Metric deviation of two parametrized probability
measures
Here are two ways to compare parametrized probability measures. Let PrMeas(≠˜)
denote the set of probability measures on ≠˜. For any detector domain ≠˜, the
Euclidean bounded metric on [0, 1] lifts to the uniform metric D≠ on PrMeas(≠˜);
that is for any ∫, ∫0 ∈ PrMeas(≠˜) we have
D≠(∫, ∫0)
def= sup
ω∈≠˜
|∫(ω)− ∫0(ω)| = sup
ω∈≠˜
[∫(ω)− ∫0(ω)], (3)
where the absolute value can be dropped because a measure space is closed un-
der complements. Applied to compare a single parametrized probability measure
evaluated at two values k1, k2 ∈K, we have
D≠[µ(k1,−), µ(k2,−)] = sup
ω∈≠˜
[µ(k1,ω)− µ(k2,ω)]. (4)
A second lift puts the uniform metric on parametrized probability measures: for
µ1, µ2 ∈ PPM(K, ≠˜)
DK,≠(µ1, µ2)
def= sup
k∈K
sup
ω∈≠˜
[µ1(k,ω)− µ2(k,ω)]; (5)
however a coarser way of comparing functions from sets to topological spaces can
be applied across different topological spaces, and for our purpose this is the more
useful comparison. With apologies to whomever knows it by another name, we call
it “metric deviation” and define it in Appendix B. For µ and µ0 having the same
knob domain K but possibly distinct detector domains ≠˜ and ≠˜
0
, respectively, we
define
MetDev(µ, µ0) def= sup
k1,k2∈K
|D≠[µ(k1,−), µ(k2,−)]−D≠′ [µ0(k1,−), µ0(k2,−)]|. (6)
An application of this metric deviation is described in Sec. 4.
4
3.2 Explanations
Besides stating results there is explaining them. A quantum explanation of a state-
ment of result µ :K× ≠˜→ [0, 1] consists of linear operators on some Hilbert space
H as functions of the knob settings, including detection operators involving ≠˜.
Products, tensor products, sums, exponentiations, etc. of operators are combined
to form a triple (H, ρ,M) in which ρ and M are functions on K. The function
ρ : K → {density operators on H} can be called a parametrized density opera-
tor, and the function M : K × ≠˜ → {Detection operators on H} is a parame-
trized positive operator-valued measure (POVM); more precisely, for each k ∈K,
M(k,−) :≠˜→ {Detection operators on H} is a POVM on the measurable sets of
≠. So defined, any explanation implies a statement of results via the familiar trace
rule
(∀k ∈K,ω ∈ ≠˜) µ(k,ω) = TrH[ρ(k)M(k,ω)], (7)
where ω ∈ ≠˜ is an outcome. Often we abbreviate this by
µ = TrH[ρM ]. (8)
Let Expl denote the function that assigns to each knob domain K and each
detector domain ≠˜ the set of explanations over those domains:
Expl(K, ≠˜) def= {(H, ρ,M)}, (9)
subject to the conditions:
1. ρ :K → {density operators on H} and
2. (∀k ∈K) M(k,−) :≠˜→ {Detection operators on H} is a POVM on ≠˜.
For any such explanation, TrH[ρM ] ∈ PPM(K, ≠˜).
3.3 Choice of explanation
Now comes the inverse problem, with its non-uniqueness. Given a statement of
results in the form of a given parametrized probability measure µ, what freedom
of choice is there for an explanation (H, ρ,M) that generates this µ? Part of the
answer comes as a proof of a logical ambiguity—not a break or a conflict, but
a place for choice: no matter what probabilities are given as functions of knob
settings, there is always room for choice of ρ and M [2, 4, 5].
Although we barely touch on them in this paper, mappings between domains
K×≠˜ and domains K0×≠˜0 induce mappings from PPM(K0, ≠˜0) to PPM(K, ≠˜);
likewise mappings on domains induce mappings between explanations on the re-
spective domains. If we view explanations and statements of results as two cate-
gories, the trace respects the mappings we have in mind, and so acts as a functor
from explanations to statements of results. This functor is full but unfaithful.
Choices of explanations for a given statement of results arise because the trace
as a functor from explanations to statements of results has a “roomy inverse,”
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Given µ ∈ PPM(K, ≠˜), the inverse image Tr−1(µ) ⊂
Expl(K, ≠˜) is a big set involving an infinite tower of Hilbert spaces and generically
including explanations that, as we shall see, have diverse implications.
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Figure 1: Tr−1(µ) contains many explanations.
3.4 Metric deviations of explanations
The concept of metric deviation, introduced above, can be applied not only to
parametrized probability measures but also to parametrized density operators and
parametrized POVMs. These metric deviations of operator-valued functions of
knobs allow comparisons of explanations finer-grained than a comparison of their
traces; unlike operator metrics for operators on a given Hilbert space, the metric
deviations allow comparisons of operators on distinct Hilbert spaces. To define
the metric deviations, we first recall metrics for operators that share a common
Hilbert space. Because of its role in quantum decision theory, the trace distance
is the most suitable metric for positive trace-class operators, including density
operators. For ρ : K → DensOp(H) the trace distance between ρ(k1) and ρ(k2)
is 12TrH|ρ(k1) − ρ(k2)| [8]. For ρ and ρ0 defined on the same domain K but with
codomains DensOp(H) and DensOp(H0), respectively, where the Hilbert space H
need not be the same or even isomorphic to H0, we define a metric deviation by
MetDev(ρ, ρ0) def= sup
k1,k2∈K
ØØ1
2TrH|ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)|− 12TrH0 |ρ0(k1)− ρ0(k2)|
ØØ . (10)
For POVMs, the trace need not exist, and we invoke the metric derived from
the norm k · kH for operators on a Hilbert space H [9]. For two POVMs with
detection operators for outcomes in ≠˜ on H, the norm k · kH permits defin-
ing a uniform metric, in which the distance between M(k1,−) and M(k2,−) is
supω∈≠˜ kM(k1,ω)−M(k2,ω)kH. Although in this paper we make no use of it, we
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define a metric deviation for POVMs M and M 0 that share the same knob domain
K but can differ in both their Hilbert spaces and their detector domains as:
MetDev(M,M 0) def=
sup
k1,k2∈K
ØØØØØsupω∈≠˜ kM(k1,ω)−M(k2,ω)kH − supω0∈≠˜′ kM 0(k1,ω0)−M(k2,ω0)kH0
ØØØØØ .
(11)
4 Topologies and metrics induced on knobs by
detections
The diversity of explanations available for any given statement of results prompts
the question: what can we learn about knobs just from detection results µ, without
invoking any of the explanations in Tr−1(µ)? So far knob domains have lacked
topology. As outlined in Appendix B.1, for any set K, a function from K to
a metric space induces a topology on K. Now probability measures on ≠˜ come
with the uniform bounded metric D≠ defined in Eq. (3). View any parametrized
probability measure µ as a function µ :K → PrMeas(≠˜), where K is taken as a
set, without any assumption of a topology, and PrMeas(≠˜) has the metric topology
induced by D≠. For V ⊂ PrMeas(≠˜), define µ−1(V ) def= {k ∈K|µ(k,−) ∈ V }. Per
Appendix B.1, µ induces a topology on K specified by
τµ = {U ⊂K|(∃V open in PrMeas(≠˜)) U = µ−1(V )}. (12)
If µ is an injection into PrMeas(≠˜), then the (bounded) uniform metric on
PrMeas(≠˜) induces a bounded metric on K. If it is not injective, then µ induces a
bounded metric on the quotient set of equivalence classes K/Eµ where Eµ is the
equivalence relation defined by
k1Eµk2 ⇔ µ(k1,−) = µ(k2,−). (13)
Examples of equivalence classes of knobs relevant to entangled states are discussed
in [5], where they are level sets relevant to entangled states that violate Bell in-
equalities. When µ is not injective, in many cases the coarse topology τµ on K
induced by µ can be replaced by a finer topology by recognizing a finer level of
description that augments the detector domain by adding another detector, as dis-
cussed below in connection with equivalence classes that characterize invariance.
Remark: Consider two parametrized probability measures µ and µ0 having the
same knob domain K but possibly distinct detector domains ≠˜ and ≠˜0, respec-
tively. If their metric deviation is zero, then Appendix B.1 shows they induce the
same topological and metric structures on K.
MetDev(µ, µ0) = 0⇒ τµ = τµ0 . (14)
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Figure 2: Expanding cycle of results and explanations.
5 Inequivalent explanations force extensions of
domains
Although ambiguities preclude logic from forcing a single explanation, the exis-
tence of ambiguity logically forces a dynamic that continually extends statements
of results and explanations. Picture a “penguin” toy walking down a slope with a
rolling gait, leaning left and swinging its right leg, then leaning right and swinging
its left leg, on and on in a cycle. From the proofs in [4] and the lattice structure of
knob domains and detector domains follows the openness of a cycle of stating ex-
perimental results and explaining these results, as illustrated in Fig. 2. This cycle
operates in a context not limited to theory but including the experimental endeav-
ors that theory describes. While here we cannot reach beyond quantum formalism
to touch them, we have experiments in mind as a background against which a
statement of results implied by an explanation can be judged and, if incompatible,
rejected.
Here is how the expanding cycle works. Given any K of more than one ele-
ment and a generic µ :K → PrMeas(≠˜) there are explanations (H, ρ,M), (H0, ρ0,
M 0) ∈ Tr−1(µ) with the property that MetDev(ρ, ρ0) 6= 0 [4]; without loss of
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generality suppose that
1
2TrH|ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)| > 12TrH0 |ρ0(k1)− ρ0(k2)|. (15)
Suppose the explanation is expanded to cover a larger knob domain in such
a way that the density operator and the POVM can be independently selected.
Leaving the choice of density operators unchanged, consider the effect of the avail-
ability of certain additional POVMs as expressed by expanding the domain of
knobs from K to Kˆ = K ∨ L where L comprises a copy of K and, in addition,
an extra knob domain B. The explanations expand to (H, ρˆ, Mˆ), (H0, ρˆ0, Mˆ 0) in
which the POVMs Mˆ and Mˆ 0 are functions on L ∼= K ∨B. We design one setting
b0 ∈ B to work so that (∀k ∈K) the setting (k, k, b0) ∈ Kˆ has the same effect as
does k ∈K; that is, the expanded explanations envelop the given explanations by
the mappings
Mˆ(k, b0,−) = M(k,−), (16)
Mˆ 0(k, b0,−) = M 0(k,−). (17)
Correspondingly, the statements of results implied by the explanations are also
enveloped [5] by the larger domain under the condition that b = b0, in that we
have (∀k ∈K)
µˆ(k, k, b0,ω) = TrH[ρ(k)Mˆ(k, b0,ω)]
= TrH[ρ(k)M(k,ω)] = µ(k,ω), (18)
µˆ0(k, k, b0,ω0) = TrH0 [ρ0(k)Mˆ 0(k, b0,ω0)]
= TrH0 [ρ(k)M 0(k,ω0)] = µ0(k,ω0). (19)
For another setting b1 of B, however, the expanded explanations can be chosen to
conflict in the results they imply. In particular, we are free to choose an explanation
in which, independent of k, Mˆ(k, b1) is the optimal POVM for deciding between
ρ(k1) and ρ(k2), while, also independent of k, we take Mˆ 0(k, b1) to be the optimal
POVM for deciding between ρ0(k1) and ρ0(k2). The trace functor generates the
corresponding probability measures on the extended knob domain:
µˆ(kj , k, b1,ω) = TrH[ρ(kj)Mˆ(k, b1,ω)], (20)
µˆ0(kj , k, b1,ω0) = TrH0 [ρ0(kj)Mˆ 0(k, b1,ω0)], (21)
where j ∈ {1, 2}. Subtracting the case j = 2 from the case j = 1 yields
|µˆ(k1, k, b1,ω)− µˆ(k2, k, b1,ω)| =
ØØØTrH[Mˆ(k, b1,ω){ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)}]ØØØ
= 12TrH|ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)|, (22)
where the last equality follows from a property of optimal decision operators [10].
For the “primed” extended explanation the same logic implies
|µˆ0(k1, k, b1,ω0)− µˆ0(k2, k, b1,ω0)| = 12TrH0 |ρ0(k1)− ρ0(k2)|
6= 12TrH|ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)|, (23)
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whence the extensions of the metrically inequivalent explanations (H, ρ,M), (H0,
ρ0,M 0) ∈ Tr−1(µ), for which MetDev(ρ, ρ0) 6= 0, though they agree in their implied
results on K, have extensions that imply metrically inequivalent statements of
results µˆ and µˆ0 on K ∨L and so conflict in their predictions of knob physics.
The upshot is an open cycle. Expanding the knob domain allows extensions
of metrically inequivalent explanations to imply conflicting extended statements
of results µˆ and µˆ0. On rejecting one of these statements, say on the basis of
experiment, and assuming the other statement of results, one treats Kˆ as a new
“given knob domainK,” and the cycle starts over, but cycling round investigations
of ever-expanding knob domains.
A lesson on the negative side is this. If quantum descriptions are inherently
multiple, look for trouble in endeavors that assume the conceptual possibility of a
single explanation. For example, many investigators of quantum key distribution
[11] have failed to disentangle quantum decision theory from a self-contradictory
(usually unspoken) assumption that a single explanation makes sense. Although
quantum key distribution avoids many of the vulnerabilities of classical key trans-
mission, some new potential vulnerabilities arise, at root because of the multiplic-
ity of explanations with their conflicting extensions to a larger knob domain. The
conflicting extensions mean that no single explanation can logically substitute for
an experimental investigation of that larger domain. For a sketch of the details
see Appendix D. On the positive side, acceptance of descriptions as inherently
multiple resolves a conceptual muddle, to which we now turn.
6 Making sense of invariance
To demonstrate an invariance we might place a round drinking glass on a table and
rotate it to show that “nothing changes under rotation.” But to see this invariance,
whether one is aware of it or not, one must manage incompatible frames of reference
[12]. Looked at one way “nothing happens when we rotate the glass”; but to see
that “nothing happens when we rotate the glass” one must see in the other frame,
so to speak, that in fact “the glass rotates,” as evidenced perhaps by a visible
speck of dust on the glass or other irregularity that, strictly speaking, violates its
symmetry and thereby makes visible its rotation.
Formally, an invariance shows up in a statement of results µ :K → PrMeas(≠˜)
as an equivalence relation Eµ on K, with equivalence classes
Eµ(k)
def= {k0|µ(k0,−) = µ(k,−)}.
Changing k within an equivalence class—a level set—leaves all the probabilities
of detections invariant. A colleague at an earlier talk asked “then why not ‘mod
out’ the equivalence classes?” Indeed, if certain changes of knob settings make no
difference, what experimental evidence do we have to speak of ‘changing a knob
setting’ at all?
Yet physicists need to speak of changes that “don’t do anything.” For ex-
ample, special relativity deals with how nothing changes when a train is put in
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uniform motion relative to a station. But, just as in the water glass, the “noth-
ing changes” must be seen also from a conflicting viewpoint in which “the train
moves.” If one tries to condense the concept of invariance into a single description,
one meets confusion; while if we recognize that multiplicity of description as part
and parcel of the concept of description, two levels of description suffice to make
invariance comprehensible.
Here is an example involving mapping a detector domain ≠˜ into a larger
detector domain ≠˜0 = ≠˜ ∨ ≠˜00, where ≠˜ ∧ ≠˜00 = ∅; in effect ≠˜0 augments ≠˜ with
an additional detector. The mapping is the injection g : ≠˜ Ω ≠˜0 that assigns to
each (ω) in the smaller detector domain ≠˜ the element (ω,≠00) ∈ ≠˜0. (In effect,
g(ω) ignores the detectors of ≠˜0 other than those expressed by ≠˜.) The injection g
induces a “contravariant” map Fg :PPM(K, ≠˜0)→ PPM(K, ≠˜) that corresponds
to marginal probability; that is Fg is defined by
Fg(µ0) = µ s.t. (∀k ∈K,ω ∈ ≠˜) µ(k,ω) = µ0(k, g(ω)) = µ0(k, (ω,≠00)). (24)
The extra detail needed to “see the glass move” shows up in the finer-level
statement of results µ0, with its dependence on an extra detector that, like the
speck of dust, expresses what happened that left the marginal probabilities µ
invariant. Taking the marginal parametrized probability obtained by ignoring the
extra detector, we get µ0[k, (ω,≠00)] = µ(k,ω), so the invariance in µ is retrieved,
now seen as a marginal parametrized probability measure, derived from a more
complex parametrized probability measure µ0.
7 Discussion
In broad terms, we offer here a recognition of guesswork as a third pillar of science
along side of calculation and measurement. Among the giants on whose shoulders
we stand are Ernst Mach and those of his intellectual descendants, Heisenberg
among them, who worried that theory seemed so remote from life in a laboratory
equipped with instruments of measurement. We owe a debt to both the push to-
ward operationalism and the counter-push that recognizes the need for theoretical
constructs having no direct counterparts on the lab bench. Tracing out the history
of these ideas in relation to an acceptance of ambiguity and the consequent role of
guesswork is an appealing project for a future collaboration with the historically
literate.
We introduce the unfamiliar term explanation for the vectors and operators
of a quantum description to contrast them with the probabilities which we say
are explained. This contrast is plain enough to see in the texts of Dirac and von
Neumann, etc. but we aimed to highlight it. Striking to us is the way quantum
theory provides both structure and ambiguity, and the structure of probabilities
becomes an essential ingredient in ambiguity of outcomes, as here conceived.
We were asked about the relationship of our work to elements of quantum
logic and quantum probability theory. Quantum logic expresses measurement out-
comes as subspaces of a Hilbert space, while we express measurement outcomes as
a field of sets, in the sense of Kolmogorov [13], without any reference to a Hilbert
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space. By detaching our concept of an event from a Hilbert space, we acquire the
power to speak of differing explanations involving differing Hilbert spaces that
“explain” the same probabilities of outcomes. Within any single explanation, the
outcomes explained can be made to correspond to subspaces of a Hilbert space
(perhaps with the use of Neumark’s theorem [14] to convert an arbitrary POVM
to a projective POVM).
In connection with quantum logic, we were asked about the relation of our
work to that of Birkhoff and von Neumann [15], who showed a role for two dis-
tinct lattices, one to do with their propositional calculus, the other to do with
subspaces of a Hilbert space. We are on the side of those who notice that in their
demonstrations of lattice properties, Birkhoff and von Neumann use garden-variety
propositional logic, and not their quantum logic, which to us is an interesting dis-
play of lattice structures. Naming the lattice structure of Hilbert spaces “quantum
logic” seems to us a misnomer that confuses the unwary. As amateurs looking
from “outside,” we enjoy the disparate views among mathematicians and logicians
about suitable rules for the game of logic; we have not yet seen anything that can
reasonably be termed “quantum” about logic.
We were asked also about the relation of our work to Gleason’s theorem.
The short answer is that we notice that in physics the Hilbert space is never an
experimental fact, but requires an act of guesswork. Once one guesses a Hilbert
space, then certainly Gleason’s theorem comes into play, and our work is consistent
with it, because we pay attention to knob domains that are roughly speaking
smaller than the space of operators on a Hilbert space. By way of justification for
the focus on knob domains that are “small” relative to a space of operators, note
that choosing an explanation involving a Hilbert space to which Gleason’s theorem
pertains, and taking the knob domain to be the whole space of density operators
and POVMs on that Hilbert space, there is always an alternative explanation
involving a larger Hilbert space with its larger space of operators, relative to which
that knob domain becomes “small.”
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A Unordered products of knobs and detectors
For any set X of sets, the unordered product πX is a set of pairs, with each pair
of the form (a,A), where a ∈ A, with exactly one pair for each set in X. E.g., if
X = {A,B,C}, then πX = { {(a,A), (b,B), (c, C)}|a ∈ A, b ∈ B, c ∈ C}. We call
the sets A, B, C ∈ X factors of the unordered product πX. Unordered products
of sets constitute a lattice with a partial order, join, meet and difference defined
by
πX ≤ πY def= X ⊂ Y, (25)
πX ∨ πY def= π(X ∪ Y ), (26)
πX ∧ πY def= π(X ∩ Y ), (27)
πX
π− πY def= π(X − Y ), (28)
where X − Y is the set difference: X − Y def= {a|a ∈ X and a 6∈ Y }.
Definition: Understanding a knob to be a set of knob settings, a knob domain is
an unordered product of knobs. We call an element of a knob domain a setting (of
that domain); it conveys the settings of all the knobs of the domain.
Remarks:
1. A knob domain resembles a cartesian product of knobs, except that: (a) it
excludes the possibility of the same knob appearing twice; and (b) t avoids
the ordering presumed by a cartesian product. Both of these exceptions to
the cartesian product are required for a join of two knob domains, defined
below, to make sense.
2. Underlying any knob domainK is its set of knobs which we denote by π−1K.
This π−1 is a forgetful functor from unordered products to their underlying
sets. It follows that
(for X any set of sets) π−1(πX) = X, (29)
and
(for K any knob domain) π(π−1K) = K. (30)
Their definition as unordered products implies that a set of knob domains
has a lattice structure, handy for expressing the relation between two experiments
that share some but not all of the same knobs. Given two knob domains K and
K0, their meet K ∧K0 amounts to the knobs they share in common, while their
join is related to the join of their underlying unordered products.
By way of the forgetful functor π−1 that takes an unordered product to the
set of its underlying sets, this lattice of knob domains is defined, for any two knob
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domains K and K0, by the following:
K ≤K0 def= π−1(K) ⊂ π−1(K0), (31)
K ∨K0 def= π[π−1(K) ∪ π−1(K0)], (32)
K ∧K0 def= π[π−1(K) ∩ π−1(K0)], (33)
K0
π−K def= π[π−1(K0)− π−1(K)]. (34)
If two knob domains share no common knob in their underlying sets, we have
K ∧K0 = ∅. In case K ∧K0 = ∅ (and only in this case), an isomorphism takes
any (x, y) with x ∈ K and y ∈ K0 to an element z ∈ K ∨K0. We express this
isomorphism as
z = x ∨ y. (35)
Two distinct ways of getting less than a knob domain play a role. Given a
knob domain K0, we can be interested in a domain K that has some but not all
of the same knobs, a relation written as K < K0. Or, we can be interested in a
subset of L ( K0. Each element of L specifies a setting of each knob of K0 but
some of the elements of K0 are absent from L.
Correspondingly, two levels of set differences enter the story. If L ⊂K, then
K −L def= {x|x ∈K and x 6∈ L}. This is the ordinary set difference. We also want
another kind of difference that applies to two knob domains K and K0. If the two
knob domains do not share all the same knobs, they have no elements in common
(so that K0−K = K0); we use π− in the expression K0 π−K to indicate the knob
domain is an unordered product of those factors of K0 that are not factors of K.
A.1 Detector domains
We suppose that each detector separately is expressed mathematically by an out-
come space. To each outcome space ≠ there is associated a set ≠˜ of the measurable
subsets of ≠. Now extend this construction by letting ≠ be the unordered product
of a set of outcome spaces {≠A, ≠B, . . .}. Let ≠˜ be the set of measurable subsets of
this product, constructed in analogy with the construction for cartesian products
of measure spaces, and call such an entity a detector domain. A detector domain ≠˜
built up from more than one outcome set contains, in addition to unordered mea-
surable rectangles, unions of disjoint measurable rectangles; indeed it is defined to
be a σ-algebra [16].
In parallel with the story for knobs, for detectors we have a lattice of un-
ordered products of outcome spaces. This lattice of unordered products of outcome
spaces induces a lattice of detector domains defined by
≠˜ ≤ ≠˜0 def= ≠ ≤ ≠0, (36)
≠˜ ∨ ≠˜0 def= ≠^ ∨≠0, (37)
≠˜ ∧ ≠˜0 def= ≠^ ∧≠0, (38)
≠˜0
π− ≠˜ def= ^≠0 π− ≠. (39)
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B Metric deviation of two functions having the
same domain but possibly distinct codomains
Consider any two spaces Y and Y 0 equipped with bounded metrics d and d0,
respectively; let X be any set of more than one element. We define the metric
deviation between any two functions f : X → Y and f 0 : X → Y 0 by
MetDev(f, f 0) def= sup
x1,x2∈X
|d(f(x1), f(x2))− d0(f 0(x1), f 0(x2))|. (40)
If the deviation is zero, we speak of f and f 0 as metrically equivalent.
In the case Y = Y 0, the functions f and f 0 can also be compared by the
uniform metric. In this case the metric deviation is a coarser comparison than the
uniform metric, and it is this coarser comparison that is most relevant to what
detections can tell about the structure of knob domains.
B.1 Topology induced on a domain by a function to a space
Let Y be any topological space with topology τY , let X be any set, and let f
be any function from the domain X to Y . Then f partitions X into equivalence
classes by the relation
xEfx
0 ⇔ f(x) = f(x0). (41)
Let X/Ef be the quotient set (set of equivalence classes) of X by Ef , and define
the projection
pf :X → X/Ef . (42)
1. Define a topology τf on the domain X by
τf = {U |(∃V ∈ τY ) U = f−1(V )}. (43)
2. Consider X/Ef with the topology pfτf
def= {W |(∃U ∈ τf ) W = pfU}. X/Ef
with this topology is homeomorphic to Im f with its subspace topology in-
herited from τY .
3. Any metric d on Y induces a metric df on X/Ef :
df (pfx1, pfx2)
def= d[f(x1), f(x2)]. (44)
4. If Y has a metric d and f is injective, then df is a metric on X.
Lemma: For f :X → Y and f 0 :X → Y , if MetDev(f, f 0) = 0 then
τf = τf 0 and df = df 0 . (45)
Proof : MetDev(f, f 0) = 0⇒ Ef = Ef 0 , whence follows τf = τf 0 . ✷
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C Diverse explanations of given results
Although statements of results leave open choices of explanations, they do indeed
impose some constraints. Here we show that except in limiting special cases these
constraints leave metrically inequivalent density-operator functions available for
explanations within Tr−1(µ).
In [4] we rather arbitrarily imposed an additional constraint on explanations
(which in that paper we called models) by separating control over the density
operator from control over the POVM, so that a knob domain has the form K =
A×B, with
(∀k ∈K)(∃a ∈ A, b ∈ B) k = (a, b). (46)
From Propositions 2 and 4 of [4] follows the
Proposition: Even under this additional constraint on explanations, there are
metrically inequivalent density operators in Tr−1(µ) unless
(∀a1, a2 ∈ A)(∃b ∈ B) D≠[µ(a1, b), µ(a2, b)] = 1. (47)
C.1 Constraint on explanations imposed by given results
A simpler if weaker demonstration of constraints imposed by results than that
given in [4] is the following. A given statement of results µ ∈ PPM(K, ≠˜) imposes
some constraints on explanations, as follows. Using the definition of D≠ given in
Eq. (4),
(∀(H, ρ,M) ∈ Tr−1(µ)) D≠[µ(k1,−), µ(k2,−)]
= sup
ω∈≠˜
TrH[ρ(k1)M(k1,ω)− ρ(k2)M(k2,ω)]
= sup
ω∈≠˜
(TrH{[ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)]M(k1,ω)}+ TrH{ρ(k2)[M(k1,ω)−M(k2,ω)]})
≤ sup
M 0∈DetectOp(H)
Tr{M 0[ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)]}
+ sup
ρ0∈DensOp(H)
TrH{ρ0[M(k1,ω)−M(k2,ω)]}
= 12TrH|ρ(k1)− ρ(k2)|+ sup
ω∈≠˜
kM(k1,ω)−M(k2,ω)kH. (48)
The last equality makes use of the relation shown in [10] for trace distance and
also hermitian property of detection operators.
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D Ambiguity of explanations in quantum
cryptography
In quantum cryptography, specifically quantum key distribution, untenable claims
of absolute security against undetected eavesdropping have arisen from the tacit
supposition of a single explanation of experimental results. Under that supposition,
security claims invoke a theorem of quantum decision theory that tells how the
minimum probability of error for deciding between two states ρ(1) and ρ(2) rises
as their trace distance decreases. For example, without regard to the multiplicity
of explanations available for any given probabilities, the popular design BB84 [17]
invokes a single explanation in which pairs of states ρ(1) and ρ(2) exhibit a trace
distance less than or equal to 2−1/2, implying a minimum probability of error to
decide between them:
PE ≥ 12 (1− 12 |ρ(1)− ρ(2)|) = 12 (1−
q
1
2 ) ≈ 0.146. (49)
But how is one to rely on an implemented key-distribution system built from
lasers and optical fibers and so forth to act in accordance with this explanation? If
a system of lasers and optical fibers and so forth “possessed” a single explanation in
terms of quantum states, one could hope to test experimentally the trace distance
between the pair of states. But no such luck. The trouble is that trace distance is a
property not of probabilities per se, which are testable, but of some one among the
many explanations of those probabilities. While the testable probabilities constrain
the possible explanations, and hence constrain trace distances, this constraint on
trace distance is “the wrong way around”—a lower bound instead of a sub-unity
upper bound on which security claims depend.
Given any parametrized probability measure, proposition 2 in [4] assures
the existence of an explanation in terms of a parametrized density operator ρ0
metrically inequivalent to ρ, such that, in conflict with Eq. (49), the trace distance
becomes 12 |ρ0(1) − ρ0(2)| = 1, making the quantum states in this explanation
distinguishable without error, so that the keys that they carry are totally insecure.
The central issue in key distribution is this: how will the lasers and fibers
and detectors that convey the key respond to attacks, in which an as yet unknown
eavesdropper brings extra devices with their own knobs and detectors into contact
with the key-distributing system? Attacks entail knob and/or detector domains
extended beyond those tested, with the possibility that extended explanations
metrically inequivalent to that used in the design, but consistent with available
probabilities, both imply a lack of security theoretically and accord with actual
eavesdropping.
Physically, one way for insecurity to arise is by an information leak through
frequency side-band undescribed in the explanation on which system designers
relied. A more likely security hole appears when lasers that are intended to radiate
at the same light frequency actually radiate at slightly different frequencies, as
described in [5, 18, 19].
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